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The application of heuristic devices has been proposed as one approach to improving consensus
decision making. The heuristics are intended to provide problem structuring and, more broadly, to
improve the process of interpersonal collaboration in work settings. This study drew from research on
group decision making (e.g., Shaw 1971; Poole 1983), problem structuring (e.g., Abualsamh, Carlin and
McDaniel in press; Cats-Baril and Huber 1987), computer-mediated communication (e.g., Kiesler,
Siegel and McGuire 1987), and technology adoption (e.g., Poole and DeSanctis 1989) to compare
alternative approaches to delivery of decision heuristics for a task requiring resolution of competing
values and preferences. Based on the arguments of adaptive structuration theory and social judgment
theory, we hypothesized that the addition of a general heuristic to a specific, computer-based heuristic
would improve group consensus; that is, the greater the comprehensiveness of the heuristic, the greater
the gain in consensus. We further anticipated that combining general and specific heuristics in an
integrated, interactive form would bring additional gains in group consensus. Greater restrictiveness in
how the groups could execute the heuristic devices was also expected to improve group consensus,
especially in cases where the specific heuristic was not coupled with the general heuristic. The results
supported some of these predictions. By comparing heuristics in terms of their comprehensiveness and
restrictiveness, we developed some understanding of how decision heuristics might be implemented
within a computer-supported meeting environment.
1. INTRODUCTION offers several types of heuristics: low or high comprehen-
sive; restrictive and nonrestrictive; divergent and conver-
Consensus decisions are judgments for which there are no gent. The current study varied the first two dimensions in
'correct' solutions but only more or less acceptable a computerized meeting environment to address two
outcomes (McGrath 1984). For these types of decisions, questions: (1) does the effectiveness of a more comprehen-
objective measures rarely exist, leaving organizations to sive (specific) heuristic improve when it is coupled with a
recognize only relatively good or relatively bad decisions, less comprehensive (general) heuristic, yielding a highly
with little refinement in knowledge of quality (Van de Ven comprehensive heuristic? (2) does greater restrictiveness
and Delbecq 1974). Examples include selection among a in the implementation of heuristics improve their impact
list of candidates for a job, prioritization of organizational on consensus? and (3) does the effect of restrictiveness
goals, or allocation of surplus resources. These are vary as a function of comprehensiveness? Based on the
judgment tasks that frequently involve resolution of value arguments of adaptive structuration theory (Poole and
differences among individuals or organizational units. DeSanctis 1989) and social judgment theory (Stewart and
Gelberd 1976), we hypothesized that coupling a general
The application of heuristic devices has been proposed as heuristic with a specific heuristic, to yield a highly compre-
one approach to improving consensus decision making. hensive heuristic, would improve group consensus. We
Development and evaluation of group decision heuristics further anticipated that presenting general and specific
has yielded a rich research literature (e.g., Cosier 1982; heuristics in an integrated, interactive form would bring
Hall and Watson 1970; Herbert and Yost 1979; Rodrigues additional gains in group consensus, and that greater
1984; Rohrbaugh 1981; Van Gundy 1981). This literature restrictiveness in how the groups could execute the
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heuristic devices would improve group consensus. By The Consensus Approach as outlined by Hall and Watson
comparing heuristics along these dimensions, we hoped to (1970) exemplifies a general, or less comprehensive,
determine how consensus tasks might be structured and, heuristic for consensus decision making. It emphasizes a
more generally, to develop some understanding of how spirit of participation and tolerance, encouraging diver-
decision heuristics might be implemented within a com- gence in group thinking. Group members are advised to
puter-supported meeting environment. openly state their viewpoints and be tolerant of one
another, but the heuristic gives no specific instructions on
the process for group discussion or the structure of
argumentation; that is, the heuristic provides few explicit
2. HEURISTICS AND CONSENSUS DECISION structural features.
MAKING
Well known specific heuristics that are high in comprehen-
According to behavioral decision theorists, people apply siveness and emphasize the group's use of specific struct-
"rules of thumb" -- intuitively or socially acquired heuristics ural features, include Rational Reflection (Dewey 1910;
-- to guide their choices and actions. Unfortunately, McBurney and Hance 1939; Barnlund and Haiman 1960),
people often apply ineffective rules of thumb to decision the Nominal Group Technique (Van de Ven and Delbecq
situations, thus failing to meet their desires of rationality 1974),the Delphi Method (Dalkey 1972), the Noninterac-
(Frank 1987). In the group setting, the application of tional method (Rodrigues 1984), Strategic Assumptions
ineffective heuristics has been well documented (Janis Surfacing and Testing (Mason and Mitroff 1981), and
1972; Van de Ven and Delbecq 1974). In the case of Social Judgment Analysis (Rohrbaugh 1981). In recent
consensus decision tasks, decision theorists propose that years, comprehensive heuristics such as these have begun
groups can solve complex problems more effectively if their to be embedded in computer software systems intended for
discussion includes high member participation and a use by groups during decision making (e.g., DeSanctis,
decision-making structure (Becker and Baloff 1969; Sambamurthy and Watson 1987; Nunamaker, Applegate
Holloman and Hendrick 1972; Shaw 1971). They propose and Konsynski 1988).
that groups be give supplemental heuristics that structure
information generation and handling during the decision In addition to their comprehensiveness, heuristics can also
process (Holloman and Hendrick 1972). Thorough be distinguished in terms of their rest,ictiveness. A group
evaluation and critiques of inferences and assumptions are decision heuristic is restrictive to the extent that it limits,
considered essential to an effective group process (Janis or channels, the group's use of the resources inherent in
1972; Stewart and Gelberd 1976). the heuristic (Silver 1988): The heuristic is highly restric-
tive if the structural features are sequenced and instruction
A variety of heuristics, or decision techniques, have been is given on their execution; the heuristic actively excludes
proposed for use in group consensus tasks (see Van Gundy the use of other (and presumably less effective) approaches
1981). Although these could be described in terms of the to managing the decision process. When heuristics are
specific advice that they provide to groups, they are more restrictive, group members are less likely to bring old ways
meaningfully distinguished in terms of two fundamental of behaving or rules of thumb to bear when applying the
dimensions: comprehensiveness and restrictiveness. heuristic. Alternatively, if the heuristic is less restrictive,
then it is implemented in an open-ended fashion; structural
Comprehensiveness refers to how general or specific is the features are made available to the group, but the members
structure provided by the heuristic. The heuristic repre- are left to their own devices to determine exactly how the
sents a resource, in the form of a structure for group features are to be implemented during group discussion.
process, and this resource may vary in the degree of The degree of restrictiveness is not so much a charac-
specific support activities that it provides to the group. teristic of the heuristic itself as its implementation. That
Adaptive structuration theory, a theory of technology is, the Consensus Approach, the Nominal Group Tech-
adoption, defines these aspects as the heuristic's "spirit," or nique, and Social Judgment Analysis may be more or less
general ends and attitudes the heuristic aims to promote, restrictive depending on the degree to which group
and its "structural features," which are the particular set of members can opt to execute the features in a particular
activities or capabilities that the heuristic provides (Poole sequence or fashion or to ignore them altogether.
1983; Poole and DeSanctis 1989). A general heuristic
emphasizes a philosophy of decision-making and is limited There is ample evidence that groups can benefit from the
in the particular advice it gives to decision makers (Abual- structure provided by heuristics. Indeed it appears that
samh, Carlin and McDaniel in press; Cats-Baril and Huber even a modest addition of structure to the decision process
1987). A specific heuristic emphasizes the particular helps to overcome some of the difficulties associated with
structural features and instructs the decision makers to natural, "free interacting" groups (Smith 1973). However,
apply a specific set of activities during the decision process. there is less conclusive evidence on the relative effective-
A given heuristic may contain both general and specific ness of available heuristics or on the importance of the
elements, but the heuristic tends to stress one aspect over dimensions of comprehensiveness and restrictiveness. As
the other. group decision heuristics become embedded into computer
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systems, questions arise about what heuristics should be One proposed approach for facilitating adoption of
included in these systems and how they should be pres- comprehensive heuristics has been the use of computer
ented to users. Given that group members are faced with programs during group discussion (DeSanctis and Gallupe
a consensus decision, should they employ a general or a 1987; Huber 1984). The hope is that interactive computing
specific heuristic, or both? a more restrictive heuristic or may ease application of the heuristics, obviating the need
a less restrictive heuristic? In other words, how do for a group facilitator or special training in the heuristic
comprehensiveness and restrictiveness in heuristics affect (Dickson et al. 1989). Computing can take over some of
group consensus? Our study aimed to examine this the computational burdens associated with specific struc-
problem. tural features (such as recursive voting or calculation of
group judgment scores) and provide groups with rapid
feedback on the ideas of individuals and where individuals
stand with respect to the group's judgments. Despite these
3. HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS OF HEURISTICS potential advantages, the research to date is disappointing
with respect to the actual benefits realized with computer
delivery of heuristics. Several studies have found no
3.1 Effects of Comprehensiveness advantage of computers over paper and pencil as a delivery
method for specific heuristics (Cats-Baril and Huber 1987;
There is reason to expect that certain general heuristics, Easton, Vogel and Nunamaker 1989; Watson, DeSanctis
such as the Consensus Approach, will be sufficient to and Poole 1988). One difficulty may be that when compre-
pron:ote coilsensus (agreen:ent) iii a group. Consensus is hensive heuristics are implemented in computer systems,
the degree to which individual group members will make they are typically not coupled with general heuristics. That
the same decision as the group following discussion. is, the group is provided with a set of structural features
Studies by Hall and Watson (1970), Nemiroff and King but given little or no general information on the spirit of
(1975), and Nemiroff, Passmore and Ford (1976) demon- the heuristic. To improve effective use of computerized
strate that the Consensus Approach leads to higher levels heuristics, it may be important to enrich the specific
of group consensus than an unsupported, free interacting heuristic by adding a general heuristic. This may be
approach to decision making. This result is consistent with particularly important when the heuristic is made available
the reasoning of the theories of social comparison (Fest- for the group to use on their own, without extensive
inger 1954) and persuasive arguments (Vinokur and training or use of a facilitator. From an adaptive struc-
Burnstein 1974). Put in terms of adaptive structuration turation theory viewpoint, an explicit statement of the spirit
theory, the spirit of the heuristic is sufficiently powerful to of the heuristic should encourage successful adoption of
promote participation and information sharing in the the structural features made available to the group. We
group; a rich set of structural features is not required. The can hypothesize that couplmg a spec(fic heittistic with an
Consensus Approach, which encourages the group to state appropriate general heuristic to a specific heuristic will
and explain their positions but gives few specific instruc- improve group consensus over use of the specific heuristic
tions on the steps for group discussion or the structure of alone.
argumentation, is a general heuristic that should be
adequate for promoting group consensus. Presuming that both general and specific heuristics are
provided, how should they be presented to users? Cats-
General heuristics can be simply stated -- usually in a page Baril and Huber (1987, p. 351) have observed that "For
or two of text -- and do not require computerization or decision aids designed to address ill-structured problems,
other elaborate means of presentation to decision makers. it is not clear that computer delivety is useful. We could
How should more specific, comprehensive heuristics be find no evidence from the marketplace or from research
presented to users? For these heuristics to successfully literature suggesting that this is the case.' It may be that
influence consensus, they must be used, and used properly, merely presenting heuristics on a computer screen will not
by the group during discussion. Yet, when left to their provide any added value over listing the heuristics on a
own devices, decision makers are known to resist or fail to sheet of paper; but if a system is devised to interactively
fully use heuristics effectively for a variety of reasons, facilitate use of the highly comprehensive heuristic
including unfamiliarity with the decision method (novelty throughout the meeting, then itmay serve to ease the
of the new procedure and cognitive load associated with cognitive load of the group as they adopt new decision
applying it) and a preference for including nonrational, methods to replace old, preferred decision patterns (Cats-
emotive elements in choice and judgment (DosSantos and Baril and Huber 1987; Howard 1988). There is some
Bariff 1988; Zigurs, DeSanctis and Billingsley 1989; preliminary evidence that this may indeed be the case
Howard 1988). Indeed, the richer the heuristic in compre- (Cats-Baril and Huber 1987). In short, the combination of
hensiveness, that is, the more structural features or specific and general heuristics and interactive delivery
philosophical elements it contains, the more difficult the should provide the most effective support for group
adoption process may be. Given the difficulty of imple- decision making. So we hypothesize that 17 multiple
menting comprehensive heuristics, what can be done to heuristics are supplied to the group, such as a conibilia-
encourage their successful use? tion of general and specific heuristics, then presenti,ig
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them in an integrated, interactive fashion should improve adaptive structuration terms, excessive restrictiveness may
tlzeir effectiveness over presenting them without such cause groups to lose their sense of ownership and control
integration. over the technology that is there to support them -- thus
reducing group consensus rather than enhancing it. But,
regardless of level of comprehensiveness, rest,iction
should help the group move smoothly through the struc-
3.2 Effects of Restrictiveness tural features in the specific heuristic, discouraging group
members from "getting off the point" during discussion,
In addition to coupling a general heuristic with a specific and thus reducing the time required to reach a decision.
heuristic and presenting the heuristics in interactive form,
successful adoption may also be affected by the degree of
restrictiveness in the implementation of the heuristic. 4. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
Supplemental heuristics represent external resources, or
structures, that groups struggle to incorporate into already In order to test the hypothesized effects of compre-
learned approaches to decision making (Poole and hensiveness and restriction in heuristics on consensus and
DeSanctis 1989). Adaptive structuration theory would decision time, a laboratory experiment was conducted
predict that the way in which groups adjust to these novel comparing consensus-seeking groups on three levels of
structures is highly variable, depending on the group's comprehensiveness and two levels of restrictiveness,
cognitive interpretations of the structures, early experiences resulting in a 3 X 2 factorial design. One additional
with the structures, prevailing practices with related treatment, constituting a control group, was conducted
structures, and so forth (Poole, Seibold and McPhee 1985). subsequent to the study and will be described later.
Since the combination of these forces is unique in every
group, adaptation to structures is idiosyncratic to the Comprehensiveness was varied by providing groups with
group. Consequently, heuristics cannot be implemented in either (a) a specific heuristic alone (referred to as the
a way that guarantees their effectiveness. Decision analysts "specific alone" treatment), (b) both a specific and a
can, however, more or less channel group response to general heuristic -- presented together but not in an inte-
structures by increasing their degree of restrictiveness grated form (the "coupled" treatment), or (c) an integrated
(Silver 1988). package containing both the specific and general heuristics
-- so that the two heuristics would appear as one highly
To the extent that increased restrictiveness in the heuristic comprehensive heuristic (the "integrated" treatment). The
encourages its full use (rather than partial use or abandon- specific heuristic consisted of a social judgment policy
ment) and channels effective learning of the heuristic approach to decision making (Rohrbaugh 1981) that cued
(Silver 1988), restrictiveness should reduce variance in groups to define and discuss the problem; identify and
group adaptation and improve the probability of successful weight criteria for evaluating alternative solutions to the
adoption. On the other hand, we also know that many problem; consider alternative solutions to the problem; and
groups are capable of reaching good decisions without evaluate the alternatives using recursive rating, ranking,
following a strict sequence of decision steps or proceeding and/or voting procedures, with intermittent discussion of
with a highly organized approach (Hirokawa 1985; Payne aggregated information. The features within the heuristic
and Bettman 1987); restrictiveness will not guarantee an were ordered to encourage divergent thinking (expansion
improvement in decision consensus - even if the restriction of the range of ideas to be considered) followed by
is objectively rational and logically sound. The importance convergent thinking (reduction to a viable set of alter-
of restricting execution of heuristics may be dependent natives) (Abualsamh, Carlin and McDaniel in press),
upon the degree of comprehensiveness in the heuristic. If consistent with the ordering of structural features within
a set of structural features are provided to the group (i.e., Social Judgment Analysis (Rohrbaugh 1981), Rational
a specific heuristic) witliout a general statement of Reflection (Barnlund and Haiman 1960; Dewey 1910;
philosophy (i.e., an appropriate general heuristic), then McBurney and Hance 1939), the Nominal Group Tech-
restriction may enhance the probability of successful nique (Van de Ven and Delbecq 1974), and the Noninter-
adoption of tlie heuristic. But adding an appropriate actional method (Rodrigues 1984). Jointly these structural
statement of philosophy (i.e., a general heuristic) may features promote vigilant decision making (Janis and Mann
reduce the needfor resbictiveness during implementation, 1977). The specific heuristic was made available through
since the group will be less likely to bring in learned, a computer system.
ineffective rules of deciding when this component is added
to the heuristic; the general heuristic cues them on how to The Consensus Approach (Hall and Watson 1970) served
use the structural features of the specific heuristic without as the general heuristic. It consists of a general statement
constraining the way in which they employ these resources. of philosophy on the meaning of consensus and six general
That is, if the heuristic is adequate in communicating its guidelines for achieving consensus. In the coupled treat-
spirit and structural features to the group, excessive ment, groups were provided with the specific heuristic and
restrictiveness may be stifting to the group, prohibiting the Consensus Approach. They were instructed to use
active, constructive adaptation to the technology; in both heuristics in their decision process. In the integrated
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treatment, the heuristics were woven together to provide 43 The Computer System
an integrated package for the group.
All treatments accessed the specific heuristic through a
Restrictiveness was varied by instructing groups to either computer system developed at the University of Minnesota
(a) use all of the available structural features and apply for support of group decision making (DeSanctis, Samba-
them in a sequential fashion until a decision was reached murthy and Watson 1987). The system has been used in
(higher restrictiveness), or (b) select the features that prior studies of group judgment and choice (Dickson et al.
seemed most useful and apply them in any meaningful 1989; Watson, DeSanctis and Poole 1988; Zigurs, Poole
order (lower restrictiveness). and DeSanctis 1988). For the current study, the computer
system incorporated the features described in the Overview
above. To access the system, group members were seated
4.1 Subjects at a horseshoe-shaped table, with a terminal and display
screen for each group member and a large "public" viewing
Experimental participants were 239 students enrolled in screen in front of the group. Individuals could enter
upper division courses within a college of business at a problem definitions, alternative definitions, weights, ranks,
large midwestern university. On average the students were and votes from their private terminals. The system then
25 years old, with 2.5 years of full-time work experience. performed the functions of recording, storing, and dis-
Many of the students were employed full-time in business playing group ideas, comments, and aggregated (average
settings when the study was conducted, and most were and ranges) voting information. The system is easy to use
working at least part-time. The students were organized and menu-driven and does not require a facilitator or
into 56 groups of three, four, or five members who were technician for operation.
working as business teams fur various class projects. The
teams were "live" groups in that they were actively working
together on class assignments at the time the study was 4.4 Procedure
conducted. The teams had met an average of seven times
prior to participating in the study, for an average of 1.57 The experimental procedure was as follows:
hours per meeting. The teams participated in the study
voluntarily, and they received a modest number of course
points for their participation. Although the use of live 1. Individuals listened to a standard introductory script
groups prohibited random assignment of subjects to read by the experimenter, then read a background
groups, prior research on group decision making indicated statement for the Foundation Task.
that whenever possible groups with a meaningful history
and future should be used for experimental research; in 2. Individuals completed a consent form, a background
this way the initial socialization that occurs early in group questionnaire, and then allocated funds to a series of
formation can be avoided during the data collection five sets of six projects each that had requested
(Bormann 1970). Groups were randomly assigned to support from the philanthropic foundation. One of
experimental treatments. these sets of six projects was used to calculate pre-
meeting consensus for the group and served as the
42 The Consensus Task task for the group decision in the next step of the
procedure. The other five sets were given to provide
'The Foundation Task," developed by Watson, DeSanctis practice in the task and to help stabilize reasoning
and Poole (1988), served as the consensus task. This task processes.
requires group members to allocate a sum of money
among six competing projects that have requested funds 3. Groups were given training in the heuristic associated
from a philanthropic foundation. Value conflict arises with their treatment. This involved going through a
because the team members have varying preference packet of paper materials describing the features of
structures that result in different allocation patterns. The the heuristic and learning how to use the computer
six projects that subjects can fund are based upon the six system. Training time lasted approximately 40 minutes
personality components described by Spranger (1928): in the specific treatment, 46 minutes in the coupled
theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political, and treatment, and 48 minutes in the integrated treatment.
religious. The task was validated against the Study of All groups were shown how to use each structural
Values instrument (Allport, Vernon and Lindzey 1970). It feature of the heuristic in a sequential manner. High
is considered to be a difficult task because of its low restrictive treatments were instructed that they must
analyzability and because cause-effect relationships are not follow the same sequence during their group discussion
clear (Ito and Peterson 1986; Van de Ven and Delbecq and use every structural feature, whereas low restric-
1974). Validation data show that there is no solution that tive treatments were told that they could use the
will be equally acceptable to all interest groups involved features in any order, and that they did not have to use
and that the task evokes very strong subject involvement every structural feature in the course of their group
(see Watson, DeSanctis and Poole 1988). meeting.
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4. Groups allocated funds to the six projects requesting Table 1 Mean Scores (and Standard Deviation and Cell Size)
support from the philanthropic trust.
on Post-meeting Consensus for Six Experimental Conditions
5. To determine post-meeting consensus, individuals Comprehensiveness
once again individually allocated funds to the six
projects requesting support from the philanthropic Restrictiveness Specific Specific + Specific + Overall
trust. Alone General General
Coupled Integrated
5. RESULTS
Higher .417 .608 338 .521
To test for the hypothesized effects of comprehensiveness, (.16) (.15) (.21) (.17
restrictiveness, and their interaction on group consensus, (N=10) (N=9) (N=9) (N= 28)
a full-factorial analysis of covariance was conducted. Pre-
Lower .446 .647 .457 317meeting consensus and group size were included as covari- (.13) (.23) (.13) (.16)
ates. Levels of pre-meeting consensus were controlled in (N=9) (N= 10) (N=9) (N=28)
accordance with findings of Castore and Murnighan (1978)
and Watson, DeSanctis and Poole (1988) that suggested an Overall .431 .628 .498 .519(.14) (.19) (.17 (.17)interaction between pre-consensus and decision procedures (N=19) (N=19) (N= 18) (N=56)
in predicting decision outcomes. Similarly, group size has
been found in some studies to be related to outcomes (e.g.
Hackman and Vidmar 1970; Holloman and Hendrick
1971; Thomas and Fink 1963). A probability value of less Table 3. Analysis of Covariance for Effects of Comprehensiveness
than .05 was applied to all tests of statistical significance. and Restrictiveness on Post-Meeting Consensus
Pre-meeting and post-meeting consensus were calculated df MS F pusing the method developed by Spillman, Spillman and
Bezdek (1980). This method produces a scale in the range Within Cells 1223571 48 25491
of 0 to 1 where 1 implies complete agreement in the
group. Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics for
Regression 327783 2 163891 6.43 .003*
each experimental treatment on measures of pre-meeting Comprehensiveness 387486 2 193742 7.6 .001*
and post-meeting consensus. Analysis of covariance
(Table 3) indicates a significant regression model, with Restrictiveness 1559 1 1559 .06 .806
significant effects associated with the comprehensiveness Compr X Restr 25745 2 12872.50 .607
treatment and the group size covariate. A posteriori t
tests indicate that post consensus was significantly higher
Beta t Pin the coupled treatment than in either the high alone
(p =.04) or integrated treatments (p =.001). The larger the Preconsensus .183 1.3 .197
group, the lower the group's postconsensus (r = -.42,
p=.003). Groupsize -78.38 -3.6 .001*
Table 1. Mean Scores (and Standard Deviation and Cell Size)
on Pre-meeting Consensus for Six Experiniental Conditions * p < .05
Comprehensiveness
These results suggest that the addition of the general
Restrictiveness Specific Specific + Specific + Overall heuristic to the specific heuristic improved group con-
Aione General General sensus, as hypothesized. However, consensus was not
Coupled Integrated higher in the integrated treatment than in the coupled
treatment. One potential explanation is that the groups in
Higher .260 .236 .256 .250 the coupled treatment relied on the general heuristic
(.09) (.08) (.04) (.07) rather than the specific heuristic to make their decision
(N=10) (N=9) (N=9) (N=28) (i. e., because the two heuristics were not integrated, they
ignored the specific heuristic during their discussion). ToLower .277 .262 .254 .264
(.12) (,09) (.08) (.10) check this, we did several things. First, we analyzed
(N=9) (N=10) (N=9) (N=28) computer system logs to test for differences across treat-
ments in their use of the specific heuristic's structural
Overall .268 .249 .255 .257 features. Analysis of variance revealed no significant
(.11) (.08) (.06) (,08)
(N=19) (N=19) (N=18) (N=56) differences in total feature use across treatments (F =.82,
df= 48,2, p =.445). Next we searched for differences in the
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types of features used by each treatment and discovered Table 4. Mean Scores (and Standard Deviation and Cell Size}
on Decision Time for Six Experimental Conditionsthat the integrated treatment used the criteria weighting
feature significantly more than either of the other two
treatments (p=.03 for the coupled treatment; p=.003 for Comprehensiveness
the high alone treatment). This suggests that groups in the
integrated treatment engaged in more policy capturing
activity than the other two treatments -- a process that is
Restrictiveness Specific Specific + Specific + Overall
Alone General General
more typically associated with decision quality than Coupled Integrated
consensus (Rohrbaugh 1981). The effort devoted to
discussion ofjudgment policies in the integrated treatment Higher 78.0 79.8 93.11 83.6
may explain lower consensus in this group than in the (03) (22) (10) (11.D
coupled treatment, but it still leaves the possibility that the (N=10) (N=9) (N=9) (N=28)
specific heuristic was somehow preventing groups from
Lower 50.8 92.0 99.3 80.7achieving consensus. Did the specific heuristic get in the (31) (8.D (27 (22.2)
way of groups achieving consensus? Although there was (N=9) (N= 10) (N=9) (N=28)
no theoretical reason to expect this to be the case, we were
concerned that there might have been some problem in Overall 64.4 85.9 96.2 82.15
(1D (15.3) (18.5) (16.9)our implementation of the specific heuristic in our com- (N=19) (N=19) (N=18) (N=56)
puter system. We distributed the Foundation Task with
the general heuristic alone to 12 additional groups. We
then tested the null hypothesis of no difference between
these control groups and the other experimental treat- 6. CONCLUSION
ments. Post consensus was higher in the control groups
than in the high alone or integrated treatments; however, Consistent with social comparison theory and the theory of
analysis of variance revealed no difference between the persuasive arguments, this study showed that the addition
control groups and the coupled treatment (F=.12, df= of an appropriate general heuristic to a computer delivery
19.1, p =.74). It seems that, although the general heuristic of specific heuristics can bring dramatic improvements in
enhanced decision consensus, the specific heuristic did not group consensus over the use of specific heuristics alone.
detract from the groups' ability to achieve consensus. Within the adaptive structuration perspective, this means
that it is important for computer systems to emphasize the
spirit, or general ends and attitudes the technology aims to
The hypothesized effects of restrictiveness on consensus promote in the group, as well as the specific structural
were not observed. We had anticipated that greater features. Use of an integrated heuristic did not bring the
restrictiveness would enhance consensus in the high alone anticipated additional gain in group consensus, It may be
treatment more than in the other two treatments. In fact, that our treatment created a heuristic that was so highly
the only gain due to restrictiveness occurred in the inte- comprehensive to groups that they found it to be over-
grated treatment; here groups who used the heuristics with whelming. The fact that these groups took longer on
more restriction experienced substantially more change in average to complete the decision task is evidence that this
consensus than those who were less restricted. It may be may be the case. The data on decision time also indicated
that the highly comprehensive nature of the integrated that groups in the integrated treatment benefited from
treatment was so overwhelming to groups that it was here higher restrictiveness, again suggesting that the integrated
that restrictiveness could lead to meaningful advantage. In treatment may have been too detailed fur groups to
the other two treatments, groups were able to manage comfortably handle.
quite effectively (at least in terms of our consensus
measure) without restriction in their use of the heuristics. Overall the results of this study suggest that the dimensions
Higher restrictiveness did not improve effective use of the of comprehensiveness and restrictiveness are useful
heuristics. constructs in explaining the effects of decision aids on
group problem solving. Since computerization is generally
associated with the delivery of specific heuristics rather
Higher restrictiveness did not bring consistent efficiency than general ones, the findings of this study suggest that
gains to the groups. There was less variance in the higher the benefits of these heuristics are likely to be enhanced if
restrictiveness groups than in the other treatment, but appropriate general heuristics are added during implemen-
overall discussion time was actually higher in these groups tation. Designers also might consider adding general
than in the less restrictive treatment (though not signifi- heuristics to automated specific heuristics to make the
cantly so). When the heuristics included more than the decision aids more palatable and cognitively under-
specific heuristic alone, restrictiveness did reduce decision standable to users. Finally, the tradeoffs associated with
time. The greatest efficiency gain due to restrictiveness greater restrictiveness in delivery of heuristics to decision-
was in the coupled treatment where higher restrictiveness making groups pose interesting issues for further research
led to significantly lower decision time (see Table 4). on the design of computer systems for group decision
making.
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